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Abstract Umbrella branding is a marketing practice whereby multi-product rms
leverage their reputation across dierent product categories. This paper investigates
how advertising in the market of over-the-counter (OTC) drugs aects the decision
to buy prescription drugs from a promoted brand name. I exploit specic charac-
teristics of market regulation in Germany to identify the eect of advertising and
nd positive eects of umbrella branding on sales of prescription drugs. Umbrella
branding results in market expansion, particularly for generic rms which invest in
OTC drug advertising. If the eect leads to more consumers of generic substitutes
or to more patients in undertreated therapeutic areas, market expansion can have a
positive eect on welfare.
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Umbrella branding extends the reputation of multi-product rms across unrelated prod-
uct categories. The marketing practice of linking reputation across products or services
is particularly relevant for experience goods, such as in health care markets. For ex-
ample, consumers of pharmaceuticals are typically not well-informed about the quality
(eectiveness) of the good; their awareness and quality perception may be inuenced by
the reputation of the rm. A common brand name that links products in the minds
of consumers is benecial for rms because it allows them to send more credible signals
about quality (Choi, 1998; Nelson, 1974; Bagwell, 2007). Deviations from producing high
quality, even for one product, result in prot losses for the whole product portfolio.1
The empirical problem in identifying the eect of umbrella branding is to isolate the
causal eect of the reputation of a brand name across markets. Particularly problematic
are confounding factors interfering with the spillover eect, such as direct advertising or
other supply-side factors like quality (Bronnenberg et al., 2012; Dubois et al., 2014). To
address these empirical issues, I exploit an institutional detail of the German pharma-
ceutical industry, a market with strict advertising regulations for prescription drugs and
more liberal regulation for OTC drugs.2 The brand name spillover from OTC to prescrip-
tion drugs works purely through reputation since information provision about prescription
drugs is prohibited by law. The setting isolates the eect of umbrella branding on sales
net of any other marketing eects.3
I investigate how the probability of buying a prescription drug varies with the exposure
of consumers to non-prescription drug advertising. An instrumental variable approach ad-
dresses issues from endogenous choices of advertising. In particular, I exploit the exoge-
nous variation in the timing of the advertising of OTC drugs. Data on the advertising of
OTC drugs show seasonal patterns and peaks of expenditures in each November (Nielsen
1Tirole (1996) shows that employees of a manufacturer also have incentives to maintain a high quality
and, thus, the reputation of the brand name.
2Consumer-directed advertising is not allowed in Germany as in any other OECD country with the
exception of the US and New Zealand. In the US, several academic medical centers have implemented
policies to ban the exposure of doctors to advertising (detailing) as an eort to address conicts of
interest (Larkin et al., 2017). On the contrary, OTC drug advertising aimed at patients is legal in many
jurisdictions (OECD, 2010).
3For example, the multi-product rm Bayer sells several prescription and OTC drugs, such as Adempas
or Aspirin. Each package in the portfolio depicts the brand logo (compare Appendix A (5)).
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Media, 2012). The seasonality in advertising for OTC drugs correlates with the season of
colds and the u, two common categories in the OTC drugs market.
Seasonal consumption patterns do not aect sales in my empirical analysis, since it
focuses on prescription drugs to treat chronic diseases (diabetes, epilepsy, and Alzheimer's
disease). In a reduced-form sales equation, I investigate the eects of advertising OTC
drugs on the sales of prescription drugs. I measure reputation by the stock of past
advertising expenditures, which also captures the long-lived eects of the advertising on
consumption patterns. My results indicate positive spillover eects of advertising of OTC
drugs on prescription drug demand.
A structural model complements the empirical analysis and quanties the economic
eects more precisely. I estimate prescription drug demand and allow advertising spillovers
from the OTC drug market to aect the utility of the consumer (Berry et al., 1995).
Using data from the therapeutic market for Alzheimer's disease drugs in Germany, I
estimate that consumers place a positive value on OTC drug advertising. On the supply
side, I assume Bertrand-Nash pricing of multi-product rms and simulate new optimal
prices and quantities in the counterfactual equilibrium without advertising spillovers. My
simulation shows that umbrella branding expands the market for AD drugs, i.e., the
share of annually treated patients increases by about 10 percent. In particular, generic
manufacturers expand their sales more than originators.4 The results are driven by the
larger stock of advertising expenditures of generic manufacturers in the OTC drug market,
on average e7.2m, compared to an average of e2.26m by originators.
The literature helps to explain the dierent responses of the two rm types to advertis-
ing. First, advertising allows generic manufacturers to inform patients about alternative
brands in formerly monopolistic markets (Königbauer, 2007; Hurwitz and Caves, 1988),
and it overcomes brand loyalty and switching costs (Shum, 2004; Crawford and Shum,
2005). Some generic rms dierentiate their products through advertising, a strategy to
avoid price competition among generics (Berndt and Newhouse, 2012; Reien and Ward,
2007). Second, originators advertise so as to dierentiate their products from therapeutic
alternatives or to respond to generic entry (Rizzo, 1999; Bhattacharya and Vogt, 2003;
Caves et al., 1991; EUC, 2009).
4I dene drug manufacturers as originators who invest in R&D and generic rms who bring copies of
no-longer-patented drugs to the market. In addition, European trade policies make imported versions of
originator drugs available. In my paper, all drugs can advertise and accumulate brand reputation.
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Advertising spillovers from unregulated to regulated markets can pose a threat to
the health status of consumers if, for example, umbrella branding leads to misguided
drug choices (FDA, 2014; ISMP, 2015). Regulation of pharmaceuticals is fragmented
in the US: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC ) oversees OTC drugs and the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) prescription drugs. Thus, the eciency of regulation
in pharmaceutical markets could benet from more coordinated policies. The eects of
advertising spillovers on social welfare, however, are dicult to quantify and depend on
market characteristics. If patients of under-treated diseases, such as Alzheimer's disease,
receive more medications, advertising spillovers would have a positive eect. In contrast,
market expansion through advertising can be harmful for over-prescribed medications,
such as opioids (Alpert et al., 2017).
My results are more general. Indeed, umbrella branding and advertising regulation
are also relevant in other industries. For example, regulators implement advertising bans
to protect consumers in markets such as cigarettes (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000) or junk
food (Dubois et al., 2014). From a policy perspective, umbrella branding poses challenges
to regulators if rms bypass advertising restrictions by linking reputation across regulated
and unregulated markets. An example is the beer industry in India: since advertising for
alcohol was banned it instead advertises soft drinks and drinking water (Prasad, 2009).
Related Literature  Theoretical work emphasizes the role of umbrella branding when
introducing a new product (Choi, 1998; Wernerfelt, 1988), in markets with repeated pur-
chases (Cabral, 2000), and as a substitute for external certicates (Hakenes and Peitz,
2009). Empirical work identies umbrella branding in industries other than pharmaceu-
ticals (Erdem, 1998; Balachander and Ghose, 2003; Erdem and Sun, 2002; Erdem, 1998),
e.g., in the form of celebrity endorsement on book sales of the same author (Garthwaite,
2014). My article estimates a structural model to quantify the eects of umbrella branding
and proposes a new identication strategy for advertising spillovers.
Ling et al. (2002) analyses how the marketing of a prescription drug aects the sub-
sequent sales of drugs after its status has switched from prescription to non-prescription
(Rx-to-OTC switch). The authors nd positive spillover eects of prescription drug mar-
keting earlier in the life cycle of drugs on sales after the Rx-to-OTC switch. My work
does not investigate Rx-to-OTC switches and proposes the utilization of institutional
characteristics outside the US to isolate the eect of reputation from other marketing
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eorts. Various articles on pharmaceutical markets nd mostly positive eects of adver-
tising on drug demand and market shares (Lakdawalla et al., 2013; Avery et al., 2012;
Ching et al., 2015; Iizuka, 2004; Ling et al., 2002). Several authors investigate advertising
spillovers in pharmaceutical markets, e.g., Shapiro (forthcoming) estimates the positive
eects from rm-specic advertising on the market level. Lakdawalla et al. (2013) nd
that the introduction of Medicare Part D, the US federal drug insurance program for the
elderly, increases advertising expenditures which aects drug demand outside the Medi-
care program. Authors of the medical literature investigate the eects of spillovers on
compliance (Wosinska, 2005; Donohue et al., 2007) and on doctor visits (Iizuka and Jin,
2007). My focus on the spillovers of the advertising of OTC drugs complements earlier
work by emphasizing a new dimension of umbrella branding.
Although the empirical IO literature oers models that emphasize consumer hetero-
geneity (Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001), there are relatively few applications to the com-
plex and diverse market structures of pharmaceuticals. Notable exceptions are Kaiser et
al. (2014) who analyze a reference price policy in Denmark, Dubois and Lasio (2014) who
estimate the economic eects of price constraints in France, Lasio (2015) who estimates
the impact of de-listing from insurance coverage, (Duso et al., 2014) who quantify the
eects of parallel imports, and work by Dunn (2012) and Dutta (2011) on pharmaceuti-
cal innovations. My work models advertising as a characteristic and simulates a ban on
advertising to quantify the economic eects of umbrella branding.
2 Institutional Setting and Umbrella Branding
Germany, like all European countries, prohibits prescription drug marketing toward pa-
tients. Regulation, however, does allow OTC drug advertising which was 12.6 percent of
sales in 2010 in Germany (Nielsen Media, 2012). TV aired the most advertising (56%)
and newspapers (34%). The product categories with the most advertising expenditures
in 2011 are cough and cold remedies (e141m), analgesics (e108m), and relaxant agents
(e81m) (Nielsen Media, 2012).
OTC drugs are available without prescriptions and patients choose from the shelf space
or after expert advice from the pharmacist. OTC drugs are behind-the-counter products,
i.e., are only available in pharmacies. The similarity of the place and procedure in buying
OTC and prescription drug allows us to study eects at the border of the two markets.
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In Germany, all approved prescription drugs are reimbursed by the public health in-
surance. It covers about 70 million insurees or about 85 percent of the total population
(BMG, 2015). In contrast to the US, insurance plans do not dier among insurees5 and
the providers are directly reimbursed for products and services. Supermarkets or physi-
cian oces do not dispense drugs in Germany. Patients co-pay 10 percent per package,
with a minimum of e5 and a maximum of e10. There are no deductibles or coverage gaps
in the insurance plans. A uniform incentive and payment scheme for all pharmacists and
physicians across Germany mitigates agency problems associated with third-party payers.
Physicians are free in their drug choices and can either prescribe a product (and package
size and strength) or an active ingredient. Reimbursement of physicians is independent of
their prescription behavior. Neither insurance policies nor pharmacists can overrule the
decision of the physician (aut-item regulation).6 If the physician prescribes a molecule,
the pharmacy has to oer one of the three cheapest products. Margins of pharmacists
are regulated as a xed fee plus 3 percent of the list price. Margins of wholesalers are
regulated, too, and provide disincentives for stock-piling of pharmacies. Until 2011, rms
were free to set prices and the public health insurance reimbursed the full list price of
the drug. In some therapeutic markets, reimbursement policies set incentives for rms to
decrease the price of generic drugs, e.g., reference prices or co-payments.
In Germany, promotional activities for prescription drugs comprise visits of sales rep-
resentative to physicians (detailing), free samples, and sponsored marketing conferences.
While free samples are a pure economic incentive, detailing and conferences might pro-
vide physicians with information (Ching and Ishihara, 2010). Earlier work shows that
detailing may have business stealing eects, while consumer-directed advertising result
in market-expansion (Ling et al., 2002; Iizuka, 2004; Iizuka and Jin, 2007; Ching et al.,
2015).7 I do not observe detailing and I use instruments for consumer-directed advertising
in OTC drug markets to address the issues of the omitted variable.8
5Patients may augment their uniform public health plan with a private health plan. Public health
plans, however, cover nearly all the pharmaceutical expenses of prescription drugs.
6Physicians face a non-binding prescription cost benchmark with neighboring colleagues. Physicians,
however, renegotiate the benchmarks individually and regulators enforce them poorly (Schwermann et
al., 2003). I assume that the prescription benchmark is a weak incentive for physicians to prescribe
lower-priced pharmaceuticals.
7Mizik and Jacobson (2004) estimate that one additional prescription needs about 1.56.5 visits of a
sales representative or 6.573 samples per visit.
8If observed consumer-directed OTC drug advertising and unobserved physician-directed prescription
drug advertising (or their timing) are not perfectly correlated, the empirical ndings are identied. To
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Data on the therapeutic drug markets of diabetes, epilepsy, and Alzheimer's disease
originate in the Pharmascope National database of IMS Health (2012). The data contains
sales, prices, and characteristics of all products which were reimbursed by the German
public health insurances between 2004 and 2011. Monthly rm-level, consumer-directed
advertising expenditures from Jan 2002 to Dec 2010 originate from Nielsen Media Ger-
many and include nationwide advertising in newspapers, journals, TV, radio, on billboards
and the internet.
Table 5 presents the top 20 advertising rms over the sample period. Expenditures of
rms span from e404m to e40m and total market expenditures were e5.6bn. The sample
includes eight originators that advertise OTC products, e.g., Pzer or GSK, ve generic
rms that advertise their OTC products, e.g., Hexal or ratiopharm, and eight OTC rms
that do not sell prescription drugs, for example, MCM Klosterfrau.
Figure 1 presents OTC drug advertising and prescription drug sales over time. Monthly
advertising expenditures increase over time and show seasonal trends: expenditures peak
in fall (November) at the beginning of the cold and u season.9 Advertising seems to be
correlated with a seasonal demand pattern in the OTC market, a fact also emphasized by
Ling et al. (2002). Waves of advertising are common in many industries and are referred to
as a pulsing strategy, whereby advertising peaks within a few weeks and drops thereafter
(Dubé et al., 2005).10
Figure 1 also shows sales of prescription drugs to treat epilepsy, diabetes, and AD
dierentiated by rms investing in OTC drug advertising (solid line) and non-advertising
rms (dashed line). Over time, advertising rms gain market shares. The gure shows
there are also increases in sales during or shortly after advertising peaks and signs of
inter-temporal substitution, since sales for advertising brands decrease after the peak.
The sales peaks are clearer between 2004 and 2007 and fuzzier toward the end of the
observation period. Patients seem to test drugs which invest in advertising during or after
the advertising peak periods. The upward trend of advertising drugs indicates that some
my knowledge, no study of the pharmaceutical industry reports seasonality in detailing: a large sector
inquiry of the European Union reveals market entry and life-cycle management of drugs as drivers of
detailing (EUC, 2009). Furthermore, a study of ACE inhibitor on diuretics in Canada from 1993 to 1999
does not nd any seasonal peak in detailing, e.g., Figure 1 in Ching and Ishihara (2012).
9A second, smaller peak occurs in spring (March), a common season for hay fever and colds.
10Individual-level purchase decisions and advertising exposure, e.g., number and length of consumed
commercials, would allow me to identify the eect of advertising spillovers directly. I assume an evenly
distributed advertising exposure which is constant over time and media exposure to be exogenous, e.g.,
patients who search for prescription drug information are equally exposed to OTC advertising.
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Figure 1: Prescription Drug Sales and OTC Drug Advertising
Notes: The graph shows monthly prescription drug sales for rms that invest in OTC
drug advertising and for rms that do not advertise OTC drugs from Jan 2004 to Dec
2010, and advertising expenditures in the OTC drug market over the same period.
Vertical lines indicate Novembers, the month when advertising peaks each year. For
the graphical depiction, rms are considered to be non-advertisers if their cumulative
advertising expenditures do not exceed the 25th percentile, i.e., e35,000 over 7 years.
Data: IMS Health and Nielsen Media Research.
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become loyal consumers over the observation period. The pairwise correlation coecient
of sales and advertising is .196∗∗∗(< .01).
I estimate sales of product j in time t, Sjt, as a function of advertising of rm f , aft:
lnSjt = ω ln af(j)t + ψt + χj + εjt (1)
where the function f(j) indicates the rm f selling the product j. ψt denote time xed-
eects and εjt are error terms. Product xed-eects, χj, control for time-invariant product
characteristics and help to identify the mean eect of advertising on sales (Bronnenberg
and Dubé, forthcoming). Because consumers keep marketing activities in mind, rm repu-
tation possibly depends on all advertising expenditures in past periods (Lakdawalla et al.,
2013; Berndt et al., 2003). I construct advertising stocks as the depreciated expenditure
of past periods plus current advertising expenditures (Dubois et al., 2014). Equation 2
models the advertising vector of rm f in period t as:




where stocks of advertising from the last period, aft−1, depreciates with rate λ and eft
denotes investments in advertising in period t. Since depreciation rates are not observed,
I follow Lakdawalla et al. (2013) and run a grid search for the optimal depreciation rate.
I therefore estimate market share equation 1 and choose the best model t, i.e., minimal
mean squared errors. I nd a yearly depreciation rate of 42.5 percent on advertising which
is in range of previous research.11
I instrument advertising spillovers by exploiting the timing of seasonal illnesses, like
the u. I expect the seasonality to be correlated with OTC drug advertising (compare
Figure 1) but to be independent of the prescription drug market. The seasonality of the
11Ling et al. (2002), Berndt et al. (2003), and Lakdawalla et al. (2013) nd optimal depreciation rates
between 30 percent per year to 13 percent per month. Alternatively, Dubois et al. (2014) and Azoulay
(2002) assume a depreciation rate of 25 percent and 5 percent per month.
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demand of OTC drugs is unlikely correlated with characteristics of demand of prescription
drugs to treat chronic diseases. The stock of advertising measures the reputation of rms.
Therefore, the instrument accounts for the stock of advertising by calculating a stock of
months in which the rm was exposed to peak demand in markets of OTC drugs, i.e.,
stocks of past Novembers. Formally, I dene a dummy variable of seasonality which equals
one in November and zero otherwise. The variable on the rm-level captures the exposure
of rms to high-advertising months. The sum over the seasonality dummy, depreciated
with the optimal rate for advertising, results in my instrument, the stock of seasons. The
instrumental variable approximates the distance to previous Novembers. Both measures
 season and stock of season  are independent of the error terms of sales of prescription
drugs in Equation 1. Since seasonality is correlated with monthly advertising, the stock of
seasons is correlated with the stock of advertising. In a next step, I interact the instrument
with the potential exposure of each rm to the advertising of OTC drugs. To proxy for
the number of OTC drugs per rm, I extract information on the portfolios of OTC drugs
from the rms' websites and create a dummy (=1 if OTC drugs in the portfolio). Tables
1 and 7 show the strong correlation of the instrument with the stock of advertising.
Table 1: Reduced-form Evidence of Advertising on Sales
Total Market Sales
OLS IV
Advertising (stock, e, ln) .05*** .06***
(.01) (.02)
Product FE yes yes




Season (stock, ln) 6.23***
(.48)
F − test 164
Notes: The columns present the eect of advertising (stock) on sales in
quantities (daily doses). The instrument for advertising stocks are the
stocks of season (column IV). The second part present the coecient from
the rst stage. Constants are not reported. Standard errors are clustered
at the product level and presented in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05,
*** p < .01.
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Table 1 presents results for the therapeutic markets of oral anti-diabetics, anti-epileptic,
and AD drugs. Sales, Sjft are measured in quantities (dened daily doses or DDD). The
coecients for the stock of advertising are positive and signicant across the OLS esti-
mation in column (OLS ) and after controlling for endogeneity (column IV ). I nd that
a 10 percent increase in the non-prescription drug advertising stock increases sales of
prescription drugs by .5 percent. The results compare to estimates of the elasticities of
direct-to-consumer advertising of 7.5 percent in the US. Direct advertising transmits infor-
mation on products, molecules, and brand names (Berndt et al., 1995) and is expected to
have a stronger eect than spillovers. The total eect of spillovers are most likely larger
because rms can potentially realize spillovers in more therapeutic markets. Column
(IV ) also presents results of the rst stage. The coecient is positive and statistically
signicant. Also, the F-test is above the critical value (Stock et al., 2002).
3 Econometric Model
I estimate a random coecient logit demand model (Berry et al., 1995) that accommo-
dates advertising spillovers from OTC markets as a complementary characteristic. On
the supply side, I assume oligopolistic competition and calculate elasticities, margins,
and marginal costs. The counterfactual analysis calculates equilibrium outcomes  like
price, quantities, and consumer surplus  in a market without advertising spillovers and
compares it to the status quo equilibrium.
To investigate the economic eects of umbrella branding on one therapeutic market,
the empirical analysis focuses on the prescription drug market for the Alzheimer's disease.
Its descriptive statistics are similar to the total sample, i.e., the correlation of advertising
expenditures and sales is .312∗∗∗(< .01). Furthermore, the results of the reduced-form
equation 1 for the AD drug market resemble the results for the total market.
3.1 Data
The market for Alzheimer's disease drugs in Germany included 106 dierent products
and 54 rms between 2004 and 2010. The sample contains information on seven drugs
from innovators, 45 imported innovative drugs,12 and 54 generics. The market is com-
12Imported originator drugs (parallel imports) are the result of free trade and public pharmaceutical
price regulation in the European Union (Duso et al., 2014).
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prised of six molecules: donepezil, galantamine, ginkgo biloba, memantine, piracetam, and
rivastigmine.13 Two of the molecules are o-patent and four are patented.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics by originator drugs, imports, and generics. The
statistics show the importance of OTC advertising for generic drug manufacturers: on
average, 67 percent of generic rms invest in advertising. The amount of advertising
stock, however, diers substantially: originators possess e2.2m as stock of advertising
and generic rms e7.3m. Importers possess less stock with an average of e70,000. Im-
porting rms focus on the trade of (formerly) patented products and, to my knowledge,
there is no import rm marketing OTC products.14 Most drugs from originators and
importers (71% and 76%) are sold in markets under patent protection. The market struc-
ture results in almost eightfold higher prices of drugs of originators than those of generic
manufacturers. The latter face, on average, 26 competitors per molecule. In dierent
strengths, the molecule ginkgo biloba is also available as an OTC drug (which is not
eligible for reimbursement under the public health insurance). Patients receive a reim-
bursement for ginkgo biloba if they follow the same procedure as for a prescription drug:
they obtain a prescription from the physician, hand their prescription to the pharmacist,
and co-pay. Also, pharmacies receive the same reimbursement for prescribed ginkgo biloba
as for all other prescribed drugs. Firms, however, could publicly advertise low-dosage ver-
sions of drugs that the public health insurance reimburses in a high-dosage presentation.
I assume that high-dosage presentations are dierent products, nd that advertising for
non-prescription AD drugs is minor, and discuss results from a robustness check w/o
ginkgo biloba in section 5.15
Table 5 indicates in column AD Drug which rm sells Alzheimer's disease drugs. The
OTC rm Klosterfrau spends, on average, almost e5m per month on advertising, followed
by the originators Novartis and the OTC rm Schwabe. Firms tend to adjust advertising
to market dynamics and the table shows a large variance of advertising expenditure across
13All international clinical guidelines recommend the rst-line pharmacological treatment options
cholinesterase inhibitors (donepezil, galantamine and rivastigmine) and memantine (DGPPN (2015) for
Germany; or Winslow et al. (2011) and Qaseem et al. (2008) for the US). German physicians frequently
prescribe Piracetam and high-dosage ginkgo biloba for AD patients in Germany (DGPPN, 2015).
14In addition, some rms also import medical equipment which they might advertise sparsely. The
expenditures include billboard advertising, for example, sponsoring local sporting events.
15Furthermore, status switches from prescription to non-prescription (Rx-to-OTC switch) are not a
feature of the AD drug market.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Type of Drug
Drug type Originator Import Generic All
N 588 1,547 3,107 5,242
Advertising [%] 48 47 67 59
(50) (50) (47) (49)
Advertising stock [e, m] 2.26 .07 7.30 4.94
(4.74) (.08) (11.85) (10.31)
sjt [%] 7.80 .44 1.01 1.60
(5.97) (.91) (1.80) (3.33)
Price [e/DDD] 2.62 3.19 .42 1.49
(1.5) (2.12) (.23) (1.81)
Firm [N] 6.00 8.18 26.8 2.49
(.00) (3.08) (4.05) (9.89)
Patented [%] 71 76 - 30
(45) (43) - (46)
Notes: The table displays Alzheimer's disease drug data by type (originator, import,
generic) from Jan 2004 to Dec 2010. Own calculations with data from IMS Health and
Nielsen Media Research. Std. dev. in parentheses.
rms and over time. Some rms invest only in selected months. For example, the rm
Sandoz has zero expenditure in some months while more than e2m in others.
3.2 Pharmaceutical Demand
Utility maximizing in pharmaceutical markets is not straightforward, demand structures
are complex and involve multiple parties. For example, insurance policies dene bene-
ts and patients rely on the recommendations of physicians who might have their own
preferences for particular brands or active ingredients. I assume that patients appreciate
advice from experts in experience good markets (Hilger et al., 2011). They maximize
utility jointly with their physician and pharmacist by selecting a drug (Carrera et al.,
2017; Kesternich et al., 2015). Patients can inuence their drug choice by, rst, asking
their doctors for a specic brand.16 Second, patients could choose a particular brand (or
16Previous studies show that physicians' patterns to prescribe is driven by requests of patients (Kravitz
et al., 2005). Reports from the US state that 78 percent of primary care physicians were asked by their
patients for specic drugs which they had seen directly advertised (ISMP, 2015). Most likely, the ef-
fect is smaller for advertising spillovers. My model of advertising allows spillovers of the brand name,
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package) in the pharmacy. Some patients with late-stage Alzheimer's disease may live
in long-term care facilities. The main characteristics of drug demand, e.g., free choice of
doctors and pharmacies (both may regularly visit nursing homes), are the same for all
patients. Long-term care facilities in Germany cannot tender their drug demand, e.g., in
preferred supplier contracts. Data on the product-level aggregates individual preferences
of the demand side. The model estimates pharmaceutical demand from aggregate data
and captures heterogeneous demand parameters with a random coecient (Dubois and
Lasio, 2014).
The decision of patient i = {1, ..., I} to buy drug j = {1, ..., J} is the result of utility
maximization in time t = {1, ..., T}. Consumers maximize utility over bundles of char-
acteristics including the stock of advertising expenditures of OTC drugs of rm f . The
regulator prohibits prescription drug advertising in the German pharmaceutical market.
However, patients consume the advertising of OTC drugs including information on brand
names. Individual utility of patient i for product j in period t is dened as:
uijt = −αpjt + σpjtνi + γaf(j)t + ζj + ψt + ξjt + εijt, (3)
where rm f(j) sells products j. Price of product j is pjt, ζj are time-invariant drug
characteristics, ψt are market xed-eects, ξjt are unobserved eects on utility, and εijt are
a consumer-product-specic error terms. The term σpjtνijt captures individual disutility
for prices. Advertising, af(j)t, enters as a state variable which consists of current and
past advertising expenditures discounted by the optimal depreciation rate as described in
Equation 2.17 Prices, pjt, are the prices of manufacturers per dened daily dose (DDD).
Although consumers bear co-payments, a function of prices, the strategic variable of
rms, physicians, health insurances, and pharmacists are prices. The random coecient
allows heterogeneous individual preferences for prices. Utility can be decomposed into
an individual part, σpjtνi + εijt, and the mean utility which is the same for all patients:
δjt = −αpjt+γaf(j)t+ζj +ψt+∆ξjt. I control for time-invariant unobserved and observed
i.e., between drugs from the same rm but not to competitors' drugs. In industries where advertising
spillovers contain information about the promoted product, spillovers can result in free-riding of com-
petitors (Shapiro, forthcoming).
17My model is similar to Murry (2015) for automobile demand, Nevo (2001) for cereals, or Chinta-
gunta (2002) for analgesics. Shapiro (forthcoming) and Dubois et al. (2014) show theoretical dynamic
considerations.
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drug characteristics and global shocks by product and time xed-eects which redenes
the unobserved part of utility as ∆ξjt. Utility can be rewritten as:
uijt = δjt + σpjtνi + εijt. (4)
Patients and physicians jointly maximize utility and the error terms εijt are assumed
to be independently and identically extreme value type I distributed.18 The choice prob-
ability of drug j for consumer i at time t can be written as:




J exp(δjt + σpjtνi)
, (5)
where θ = [α, β, γ, σ]. The assumption that ν is distributed with p.d.f. dPν allows to
sum up individual choice probabilities as:






J exp(δjt + σpjtνi)
dPν(νt). (6)
Section 3.3 describes in more detail the numerical solution of integral 6 and the role
of unobserved characteristics, ξjt.
The logit model includes an option to not buy Alzheimer's disease drugs which is
a composite outside good. The outside good also comprises the option to buy other
treatments, such as cognitive training applications or personal memory training, and its
normalized indirect utility is ui0t = εi0t. I calculate the total market size, M , by daily
doses potentially consumed by all Alzheimer's disease patients per month.19 The total
market size increased from about 900k to 1.1m patients from 2000 to 2010 and results in
about 30m potentially consumed daily doses per month.
18Logit demand models are special cases of the random coecients models and assume σpjtνijt = 0.
Section 4 presents mean utility estimates as a benchmark case (uijt = δjt + εijt).
19Since age is the main risk factor for Alzheimer's disease, I collect historic age-specic prevalence
rates from the German College of General Practitioners and Family Physicians (Degam, 2015) and the
European Collaboration on Dementia Project (Eurocode, 2015). Using epidemiological data adds exoge-
nous variation to our estimation. About 5 percent of the population aged over 65 and 20 percent of the
population aged over 80 are diagnosed with dementia, whereof about 65 percent are associated with the
Alzheimer's disease (Degam, 2015; Eurocode, 2015).
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I argue that the potentially unobserved purchasing patterns of patients, for example,
stock-piling or correlated purchases of prescription and OTC drugs, are not biasing my
results: rst, seasonal demand uctuation are not a feature of the observed drugs treating
chronic diseases. Second, the standardized German health insurance design does not fea-
ture a deductible, which could also explain stock-piling toward the end of the year (Einav
et al., 2015). Third, physician budgets would suggest fewer and not more prescriptions
toward the end of the budget period (which is end-December). Fourth, given the dierent
procedures for buying a prescription drug and OTC cold remedies, it seems unlikely that
chronically ill patients would pick up their prescription before buying u treatment in
November. For example, it would imply a visit to the neurologist (or geriatric doctor) to
pick up a prescription for a chronic disease while suering from the u. Also, the density
of pharmacies in Germany alleviates transaction costs for visits (1 pharmacy per 3,800
inhabitant). Fifth, an empirical test follows the economic intuition that state-dependency
aects consumer choices in the current period as a function of decisions from previous
periods (Shcherbakov, 2016). In particular, I estimate the following specication,
sjt = ωVjt + ψŝjt−1 + εjt, (7)
where sjt are market shares of product j in period t. Exogenous variables, i.e., prices,
product and period xed-eects, are captured by Vjt and market shares from the previous
periods, ŝjt−1, are instrumented with Vjt−1. In my data, patients buy a new drug package
every 6 weeks on average. Therefore, the estimates test for the state-dependency of market
shares lagged by two month. Table 6 presents the lagged coecient for market shares, ψ,
that are not dierent from zero. My results indicate absent state dependency in demand.
Moreover, state dependency of demand might be an issue when switching poses medical
risks at the curative treatment, which is not the case for AD drugs (NICE, 2011).
3.3 Identication and Estimation
The estimation strategy for the demand model in 3.2 follows the algorithm of Berry et al.
(1995) and extends it in several dimensions (Reynaert and Verboven, 2014; Hess et al.,
2006). Product xed eects account for the simultaneity problem of the mean utility δ
(Nevo, 2001). Therefore, the ∆ξ are mean independent of non-price attributes. I address
the endogeneity of the structural model by using instrumental variables and estimate the
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model with generalized method of moments (GMM). My moment conditions relate the
structural error term, ∆ξjt, and a set of instrumental variables:
E[∆ξjt|Xjt(θ), Zjt], (8)
where Xjt(θ) contains all observable characteristics and Zjt are instrumental variables.
First, variation of sales over time and changing choice sets (because of entry and exit)
help to identify the random coecient (σ) (Sovinsky Goeree, 2008). Additionally, I use
optimal instruments in the sense of Chamberlain (1987), namely the expected value of
derivatives of the unobserved quality of each product with respect to the parameter of
the random coecient σ:
zjt = E[
∂ξjt(α, β, γ, σ)
∂(σ)′
|xjt]. (9)
I follow the approximation of optimal instruments by Reynaert and Verboven (2014)
where a rst-stage with instrumental variables, Zjt, predicts prices and derivatives of the




I follow Appendix A in Reynaert and Verboven (2014) to approximate for instruments
under imperfect competition with a sample of k = 1000.
Second, if rms invest in OTC advertising to strategically inuence prescription drug
sales the endogeneity of advertising poses diculties for identication. Also, I do not
observe detailing (physician-directed advertising) which might be correlated with drug
sales or consumer-directed advertising. I instrument advertising spillovers by exploiting
seasonal illnesses, like colds, which are independent of the timing of the prescription drug
market.
Third, as a cost-shifter for the supply side, I use crude oil prices (Brent Europe)
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (Bresnahan, 1987). Crude oil
is an important production input of pharmaceuticals and unlikely to be correlated with
unobserved product-specic demand shocks. The instrument is interacted with active
ingredients to increase its exibility.
Fourth, I use traditional BLP-style instruments and construct the statistical means of
product characteristics of competitors (Berry et al., 1995). The main assumption is that
characteristics of products of competitors  and the product's location in the characteris-
tics space  are exogenous. Endogenous quality choice of rms, e.g., the choice of product
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characteristics in the short run (Crawford, 2012), is not an issue in the pharmaceutical
industry since products are either an outcome of an uncertain investment in research or
the result of regulatory changes, e.g., patent duration. In particular, I include the mean
DDD per package of all competitors in the active ingredient class, the mean product age
of all competitors, the mean package size of all competitors, and quadratic polynomials
of all variables.
Table 7 presents results of the rst-stage estimations. The coecient of seasonality
has a positive and statistically signicant eect on advertising expenditures. Tests of
the set of instrumental variables in the rst stage conrm their strength, e.g., F-values
of excluded instruments are 27 (prices) and 26 (advertising). Also, the tests for joint
instrument signicance are above the critical values (Stock et al., 2002). The market
share from Equation 6 needs to be calculated numerically.20 Own-price elasticities of























The optimal value for σ from the BLP estimation is denoted σopt. Own- and cross-











k∈f sjt) = γat(1− sjt) if f= f̃
γa ˜f(k)ts ˜f(j)t otherwise.
(11)
Since advertising expenditures vary by company, I calculate advertising elasticities
by rms. Cross-advertising elasticities are calculated between f(j) and f(k), the rms
owning product j and k.
3.4 Supply Side
I model the supply of prescription drugs as an oligopoly game where rms strategically
choose prices and advertising expenditures. My analysis abstracts from entry and exit
20I use 5,000 pseudo-random draws using Modied Latin Hypercube Sampling (Hess et al., 2006) and
100 randomly sampled starting values to identify robust coecients.
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considerations and takes market structure as given.21 The oligopoly models of imperfect
competition seem to be a good t for therapeutic drug markets where patented (originals
and imports) and generic drugs compete for market shares (Dubois and Lasio, 2014;
Kaiser et al., 2014; Dutta, 2011). High (sunk) xed costs for research and development
and moderate costs of production characterize the supply side of drug markets (Dutta,
2011).
Firms maximize prots by setting prices in the prescription drug market and advertis-
ing expenditures in the OTC market. The latter are freely set by rms depending on the
marketing strategy of their OTC drug portfolio. I assume advertising as a xed cost of
production which is sunk after investment. Firms decide each period on their advertising
stock. The model captures advertising stocks as the geometric sum of current and past
advertising expenditures with the estimated optimal depreciation rate.
Prots of rms depend on revenues from all marketed products, including OTC drugs
and non-medical drugs. I model revenues from the Alzheimer's disease prescription drug
market. The market consists of F rms, each of which markets a subset Ff of the j =
{1, ..., J} drugs in market t = {1, ..., T} . The prot functions of multi-product rms f




(pjt − cjt)Mtsjt(pt,at)− expf(j)t − Cf(j), (12)
where pjt is the price of product j and cjt the marginal costs of the same drug. Market
shares are a direct function of all price vectors in time t, pt, and of all advertising stocks,
at. Advertising expenditures of rm f(j) are denoted expf(j)t, total market size is Mt,
and Cf(j) are xed costs of production.
After observing demand factors, rms maximize revenues by setting optimal prescrip-
tion drug prices and advertising expenditures. In a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilib-
rium, under the assumption of strictly positive support, every price for product j must








21In the sample only generics and imports enter the market, which indicates regulation as being the
main driver of market structure, e.g., patent duration or reference pricing.
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Assumptions on the code of conduct of the pharmaceutical industry allow to derive
markups (pjt − cjt) and marginal costs for every product.
3.5 Simulation
By comparing the simulated market outcome without advertising spillovers to the sta-
tus quo, I explain how to quantify the economic eects of umbrella branding. In the
counterfactual scenario the eects of umbrella branding are zero and prices are the only
strategic variable of the rms. My assumption that other variables, including marginal
costs and physician-directed advertising, are unaected by the policy is in line with pre-
vious research (Nevo, 2001). The assumptions hold in the short run because rms cannot
immediately adjust drug portfolios. If the ban of consumer-directed advertising result in
higher spending on physician-directed advertising, I would overestimate the eect of an
advertising ban. The counterfactual results are subject to the usual partial equilibrium
critique.













where advertising stocks are zero, at = 0. Market shares for product j are given by:
sjt(X














where at = 0 and prices are optimal prices in the non-advertising state, p
0. The set
of product characteristics, X0, does not contain advertising stocks. For the counterfactual
price equilibrium, I solve for equations 14 and 15 numerically.
For the welfare calculation, I assume that patients choose products consistent with
their underlying preferences. Advertising does not distort consumers and lead to choices
inconsistent with utility maximization (Dubois et al., 2014). The coecient for advertising
can be interpreted as the valuation of the consumer for umbrella branding. Results of the
simulated equilibrium and the estimated demand system are inputs for the approximation
of consumer surplus. The monetary value of welfare changes due to the advertising ban
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is calculated by the Hicksian compensation variation, measured by solving the integral
over the dierences in maximum expected utilities using numerical simulations (Small

























jt are counterfactual equilibrium values for mean utility
and prices. For a more complete welfare analysis, I report revenues and public health
insurance expenditures for the two scenarios in the AD drug market. Formally, the change
in producer surplus is dened as:





and pt and qt are vectors of all prices and quantities (st ∗Mt).22 Vectors from the




Results of the rst column in Table 3, Logit-IV, assume homogeneous preferences of
patients regarding prices. The specication uses instruments for prices and advertising
to control for changes in unobserved product characteristics. Results show a negative
price coecient, i.e., price-sensitive consumers, and a positive coecient for advertising
spillovers.
The second column in Table 3 shows results of the random coecient model and allows
the individual disutility of prices. The mean price coecient is negative and the random
coecient is .34 and is interpreted as the standard deviation from the mean valuation
of prices. Table 3 presents median own-price elasticities of -1.28.23 The coecient for
22Advertising spending, expft, aects the demand of all products of rm f , particularly of OTC drugs,
and are part of the prot function. Since it is impossible to say what part of the advertising expenditure
is accrued by the AD market, by assumption, expft = 0 in the AD market. Advertising expenditures are
xed costs and are assumed to be sunk.
23Reference pricing (Kaiser et al., 2014) and tiered co-payments (Herr and Suppliet, 2017) result in
price-sensitive behavior of patients. A generic market share of almost 70 percent constitutes a competitive
generic market in Germany. My results are close to estimated own-price elasticities from other random
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Package Size -.006 -.007
(.006) (.006)












Own-price Elasticity (median) -1.28
Advertising Elasticity (median) .145
Product FE yes yes
Time FE yes yes
N 5,242 5,242
R2adj .84
Notes: Logit IV and Logit with random coecients use instruments for prices and
advertising, F-values of rst stage regressions are x (price) and x (advert.). Taste
coecients for the characteristics are retrieved from a regression of the product xed-
eects on mean product attributes (N = 106, R2adj = .78) (Nevo, 2001). Elasticities for
price and advertising are calculated based on formula 11 and 10. The estimation RC
Logit uses 5,000 modied latin hypercube sampling draws to simulate market shares.
Constant not reported. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses; * p < .1,
** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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umbrella branding is positive and statistically dierent from zero. The median elasticity
of umbrella branding is .145.
All specications comprise product and time xed-eects. In empirical demand models
with product xed-eects, a minimum-distance procedure can identify taste parameters
(Chamberlain, 1982) (see Appendix 5). I nd that consumers put a higher value on drugs
from originators and on some molecules, e.g., galantanin and rivastigmin. Utility increases
for newer drugs and package size is not relevant.
4.1 Economic Eects of Umbrella Branding
Table 4 presents results of the eect of umbrella branding on prices, quantities, and welfare
measures. The results stem from the simulation in section 3.5.
First, umbrella branding has an impact on the number of treated patients. About
10 percent more drugs are sold with advertising compared to the same market without
advertising. Quantities of generics increase by about 6.5m daily doses and of originators
by 1.5m. Changes for imports are negative and small. From a health policy perspective,
the increase in daily doses might aect the health status of the population. In particular,
the patient population of under-treated conditions would benet from more medication,
e.g., Alzheimer's disease patients (Sano et al., 2005). Generalizing the ndings is dicult
because the market expansion of overtreated drugs, e.g., by opioids (Alpert et al., 2017),
harm the health status of patients.
Second, spillovers of advertising on the demand for prescription drugs increases the
market shares of generic rms by approximately 25 percent and of originators by 3.4
percent (compared to the outside good). Firms with high expenditures for advertising
benet the most: the data shows that generic rms and originators possess stocks of
advertising expenditures of, on average, e7.3m and e2.2m. The eect on market shares
is negative for imports (-2.3 %). Patients seem to switch to the brand names that they
know from consuming OTC drug advertising.
Third, price changes are small and positive for all drug types. Generic rms increase
prices the most because they need to recover costly advertising, partially by higher prices.
Most likely, originators have high margins which allow them to invest in advertising
coecient logit demand models in pharmaceutical markets. Kaiser et al. (2014) report mean own-co-
payment elasticities of -1.19, Chintagunta (2002) of -2.5, and Dubois and Lasio (2014) of -3.49.
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Table 4: Eects of Umbrella Branding on Quantities, Prices, and Welfare
All Originators Imports Generics
w/o ad ∆ % w/o ad ∆ % w/o ad ∆ % w/o ad ∆ %
Quantities (yearly sum, m) 78.8 10.08 45.8 3.41 7.52 -2.33 25.42 25.8
Price (mean) e, DDD) 1.41 .080 2.61 .073 2.59 .016 .420 .335
Health Insurance (sum, m) 230.6 5.87 185.9 4.90 28.5 -2.29 16.11 31.56
Revenues (yearly sum, m) 174.1 5.39 143.6 4.86 22.15 -2.29 8.39 34.84
Consumer Surplus: all Alzheimer patients, yearly, e 733,572
Consumer Surplus: total public health insurance, yearly, e 48,691,059
Notes: The table presents the eect of umbrella branding calculated by changes from the simulated equilibrium
(no advertising spillovers) to the status quo. Absolute changes and percentage changes are reported. Mean values
for monthly changes from Jan 2004 to Dec 2010. Estimated parameters of the random coecient logit model are
used to predict the counter-factual equilibrium.
without raising their prices by too large a sum. More intensive competition by advertising
generics also helps to contain originators' prices.
Fourth, advertising spillovers into prescription drug markets increase the total expen-
ditures of the public health insurance (including pharmacy reimbursement and sales tax)
by about 5 percent. Although expenditures for generics increase by 30 percent, the total
amount of e740k is a fraction of costs of originators' increases.
Fifth, on the supply side, revenues increase with advertising by an average of 5.3
percent. Firms sell more products with advertising and revenues from the Alzheimer's
disease drug market increase by e3.3m.
Sixth, consumer surplus of umbrella branding is about e733k per year. AD drugs with
advertising spillovers become more attractive compared to competing products without
advertising and to the outside good. The consumer surplus is a trade-o between bene-
ts from more treated (and healthier) patients and higher expenses of the public health
insurance. The welfare eect is positive for the undertreated disease of AD and under the
assumption of non-biased decision-making of consumers (Dubois and Lasio, 2014).
Seventh, direct advertising of Alzheimer's disease drugs with the molecule ginkgo biloba
can have a market expansion eect through advertising spillovers on the drug class. Since
I only observe rm-level advertising expenditures, I cannot disentangle the eect of direct
advertising and umbrella branding on ginkgo biloba. However, I empirically test how its
exclusion from the demand estimation aects the results (not reported). The advertising
coecient is positive, of similar magnitude, and statistically signicant. Furthermore,
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advertising for ginkgo biloba is small, e.g., the maximum share of advertising for ginkgo
biloba is less than 1.8 percent of total OTC drug advertising expenditures (Nielsen Media,
2012).
5 Interpretation and Discussion
Umbrella branding links the reputation of rms across products. I show that umbrella
branding across OTC and prescription drugs has a positive eect on sales of prescription
drugs. The identication relies on the institutional setting of advertising regulation in Ger-
many, a market that bans consumer-directed advertising of prescription drugs. Umbrella
branding results in market expansion of about 733k daily doses per year. In particular,
generic rms (that invest a lot in OTC drug advertising) benet from a large eect on
their aggregate sales.
The welfare eects based on the expansion of pharmaceutical markets should be eval-
uated with caution. Some therapeutic markets are already overtreated, such as with
opioids, and a market expansion would be harmful to patients. Undertreated conditions,
however, would benet from more medicated patients, e.g., the Alzheimer's disease (Sano
et al., 2005). For preventive therapies, the treatment of an acute outbreak can result in
high costs. Health insurances might justify expenditures for additional preventive phar-
maceuticals to avoid follow-up costs. Positive spillovers on prescription drugs imply more
advertising in the OTC market than in an isolated market. Too much OTC advertising
could result in more demand for OTC products and might, in extreme cases, result in ad-
verse health eects. The possibility of the overuse of OTC drugs seems relatively unlikely
since in Germany they consist largely of herbal molecules and low-dosage molecules.
If an eective ban of advertising is of interest to regulators, they might adapt the insti-
tutional design of drug market policies. Policymakers could cooperate to adapt guidelines
for drug packaging, for example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC ) and the FDA.
If similarity of product names or the umbrella branding of a product portfolio confuses
patients, clear guidelines for product packaging and marketing could ultimately assist con-
sumers. The existence of spillovers urges the development of guidelines for drug labeling,
for example, the display of active ingredients on the package (ISMP, 2015).
Another aspect is the strategic implication for rms. For example, in some markets,
like the AD drug market, the advertising eects might be larger for generic rms than
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for originators. As a policy to promote generic substitution, regulators could promote the
advertising of generic drug manufacturers in order to increase their market shares.
Moreover, some originators, such as Pzer, have been in the market for several decades
while others are newly established brand names, e.g., through mergers. For example,
Bronnenberg et al. (2012) nd long-lasting eects of brand capital for consumer goods in
supermarkets. To disentangle the eects of established brand names and of advertising
in the pharmaceutical industry is a promising topic for future research.
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APPENDIX A
Taste Parameters and Brand Fixed Eects
Nevo (2001) and Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013) suggest projecting the vector of brand
dummy coecients from the demand estimation (Equation 3) onto product character-
istics. Formally, the term d denotes the product dummy coecients, X the matrix of
time-invariant product characteristics such as package size, import label, drug age, con-
centration, and molecule. ξ are unobserved product characteristics. From the individual
patient utility function follows:
dj = Xjβ + ξj. (18)
The assumption E[ξj|Xj] = 0 allows us to estimate β̂, the taste parameters for product
characteristics (Nevo, 2001). The assumption originates in previous work to rationalize




Figure 2: Bayer OTC drug example (Bayer sales 2014: e12bn)





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: This table presents results for the test on state
dependency as suggested in Shcherbakov (2016). The
dependent variables are market shares (in daily doses
sold) and prices are in e and per daily dose. Constant
not reported. Standard errors in parentheses are clus-
tered on the product level. * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***
p < .001.
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No. products other ATC5 .075*** -.072
(.01) (.11)
Package size (own nest, mean) .017*** .324***
(.00) (.02)
Package size (other nests, mean) .046*** .577***
(.00) (.06)
DDD (other ATC7, mean) -.056*** -.041
(.00) (.05)
DDD (other ATC7 & rm, mean) .001 -.057
(.00) (.03)
DDD (own rm, mean) .135*** -.980*
(.03) (.40)
DDD (own nest, mean) 1.493*** 1.378
(.13) (1.06)
Age (own nest, mean) .140 -.200
(.08) (.95)
Quantity (own rm, mean) -.112*** -.160
(0.02) (0.27)
Crude oil × Donepezil yes yes
Product FE yes yes
Time FE yes yes
F − test excl. IV 27.07 26.95
N 5,242 5,242
Notes: First-stage estimation results for price and advertising stock. Constant not
reported. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses; * p < .1, ** p < .05,
*** p < .01.
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